Cloud Security
You've been handed an AWS account, and the identity you get is a role with broad permissions baked in that you didn't create, can't edit, and definitely can't run iam:CreatePolicy against to carve out something narrower. The task sounds trivial: store
Cloud Security
A publicly exposed serverless function with no authentication is a normal, often deliberate architecture choice. Plenty of workloads have to be reachable by anonymous users. The trouble is what sits behind it: custom code, third-party packages, and an identity attached to the runtime. Get code execution in that container
Cloud Security
ELB is the piece that makes "highly available on AWS" mean something — a stable entry point that spreads traffic across targets, drops unhealthy ones, survives an AZ going dark, and scales with Auto Scaling underneath. The three flavors solve different problems, and picking the wrong one is the
Cloud Security
Why Standards Exist, and Why You Run Several at Once Cloud security standards translate legal, contractual, and industry expectations into auditable controls for identity, data protection, logging, and resilience. They give security, legal, and engineering teams a shared language for controls, evidence, and assurance. The thing nobody tells you starting
Cloud Security
You Don't Have a Tooling Problem. You Have a Mapping Problem. Most cloud security teams already own too many tools. Yet misconfigured storage, excessive permissions, vulnerable workloads, and exposed Kubernetes services still create exploitable attack paths. The problem isn't a lack of tooling. It's
Cloud Security
Virtual machines offer a layer of isolation, but they are not a security boundary you can fully trust. Understanding where that isolation breaks down — and how to tighten it — is essential for anyone running sensitive workloads inside a hypervisor. Weaknesses Host-to-Guest and Guest-to-Host Compromise The trust